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The Asian tsunami of 26 December 2004 destroyed lives and entire Indian Ocean 
coastal communities. Within minutes 
of an earthquake measuring 9.0 
on the Richter scale striking the 
west coast of northern Sumatra in 
Indonesia, the first large tsunami hit 
these shores to devastating effect, 
especially between Banda Aceh and 
Meulaboh in Aceh. A massive upward 
shift in the seabed also caused 
tsunamis to hit coastal communi-
ties in parts of western Thailand, 
Burma, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, eastern 
India and the Maldives before reach-
ing the coast of Africa, with terrible 
damage to life and property. In the 
aftermath of this massive natural 
disaster, some 290,000 people were 
dead or missing, and more than one 
million displaced, across 12 affected 
countries.
As news of this natural disaster 
broke, it sparked an extraordi-
nary mobilisation of resources for 
humanitarian relief and assistance 
by private citizens and corpora-
tions, NGOs and governments in the 
affected countries and beyond. An 
elaborate international machinery of 
expertise in the coordination and de-
livery of relief and assistance in com-
plex humanitarian emergencies was 
revved up and deployed in affected 
areas. In places, the sheer scale of 
the destruction posed formidable lo-
gistical difficulties for the delivery of 
basic humanitarian relief to affected 
populations and in many cases na-
tional and/or foreign military forces 
were needed to enable access to 
affected populations. Another major 
challenge in the emergency relief 
phase stemmed from the fluidity 
of displaced populations. This was 
especially the case in Aceh, as survi-
vors from affected areas sometimes 
moved between public or community 
spaces, host families, tent camps and 
other temporary shelters.
 
Mapping the situation and location 
of survivors was not easy. National 
governments, international donors 
and humanitarian organisations put 
much energy into establishing the 
nature and extent of the impact of 
the tsunamis – the destruction of 
homes, livestock and livelihoods; 
loss of property, land titles and other 
important documents; and damage 
to public infrastructure. A prolifera-
tion of damage assessments, surveys 
and maps, drawing on an array of 
expert knowledge, provided guide-
lines to shape donor and national 
government’s rehabilitation and 
reconstruction plans.
Beyond issues of coordination and 
expertise in complex humanitarian 
emergencies, it is important to refo-
cus attention on the nature, direction 
and pace of relief and reconstruc-
tion efforts which remain embedded 
within complex relations of power 
shaped by national and local politics 
in the affected areas. The diverg-
ing responses to the unprecedented 
direct impact of this massive single 
disaster on 12 different countries, 
with their own distinctive politi-
cal, economic and social dynamics, 
underscores the powerful effects of 
everyday politics upon humanitarian 
efforts, whether amateur or profes-
sional, local or international. To date, 
however, little systematic effort has 
been made to examine the role or 
significance of political dynamics 
and patterns affecting humanitar-
ian relief and reconstruction across 
tsunami-affected areas. 
Betwixt and between the natural 
disaster and pre-existing complex 
humanitarian emergencies, many 
tsunami survivors have had to ne-
gotiate a range of constraints. In the 
case of Aceh, where conflict, violence 
and a massive counter-insurgency 
campaign against separatists has 
displaced over 300,000 people since 
1999, the IDP ‘identity’ of tsunami 
survivors has become politically 
sensitive and contested. By definition 
the term ‘IDP’ includes those forced 
by natural disasters to leave their 
homes, yet Indonesian government 
officials and international humani-
tarian organisations have at times 
referred to them as ‘homeless’. Such 
distinctions have critical implications 
for identifying the rights and guar-
antees to protection and assistance 
of affected populations, as well as 
the role and obligations of local and 
national government set out in the 
UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement.
In Thailand, with its punitive ap-
proach to containing a large refugee 
and migrant worker population 
from neighbouring Burma, there is 
evidence of de facto discrimination 
by local government authorities and 
Thai citizens against Burmese tsuna-
mi survivors in the affected southern 
provinces. As the Thai government 
declared a position of self-reliance 
in the coordination and delivery of 
post-tsunami emergency relief, thus 
affording an unrivalled opportunity 
for Premier Thaksin Shinawatra and 
his Thai Rak Thai (Thai Loves Thai) 
political party to campaign for the 
6 February 2005 elections, Burmese 
migrant workers were also com-
paratively isolated from alternative 
sources of assistance and support, 
including from their own military-led 
government. Burmese migrant work-
ers have been excluded in the distri-
bution of emergency relief and the 
implementation of Thai government 
aid programmes by local officials, as 
well as targeted for arrests by local 
police in post-tsunami crackdowns 
on ‘illegal migrants’, leading, in many 
cases, to eventual deportation back 
to Burma.  
In the case of India, where the 
government also declined offers of 
a coordinated international humani-
tarian emergency response, there is 
evidence of discriminatory practices 
by local officials and populations 
alike against dalits (still commonly 
referred to as ‘untouchables’) in tsu-
nami-affected areas. Trapped within 
a social structure of caste-based hier-
archy and domination, dalit survi-
vors were reportedly only reluctantly 
received in many temporary shelters 
and camps housing (higher caste) 
IDPs from coastal fishing communi-
ties; some dalits were driven away. 
There is also evidence of other IDPs 
preventing government officials, 
NGO staff and other civil society 
groups from distributing emergency 
relief to dalits.
Another crucial dimension of the 
tsunami emergency response stems 
from the primacy of military-stra-
tegic considerations in some of the 
worst affected areas, most notably 
Aceh, the Northern and Eastern 
provinces of Sri Lanka and arguably, 
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the Nicobar Islands of India. Aceh 
has been massively militarised by 
the presence of 40,000 soldiers since 
a state of emergency was declared in 
May 2003. With forcible relocation 
into camps an integral part of recent 
counter-insurgency campaigns, the 
role of the Indonesian military in 
the post-tsunami distribution of 
emergency relief, as well as in the 
coordination of IDP relocation into 
controversial ‘barracks’, has seri-
ously compromised the principles 
of humanitarian assistance in many 
cases. In the case of Sri Lanka, more-
over, the coincidence of the tsuna-
mi’s path of destruction with the 
so-called ‘uncleared areas’ along the 
coastal belt of zones controlled by 
the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) has made for a sluggish 
relief operation as the government 
in Colombo has firmly opposed any 
mechanisms to bypass its central 
authority. The absence of a central 
government response is further 
highlighted by the Somalian case. 
Finally, in the Nicobar Islands, home 
to Indian strategic naval bases, there 
is evidence to suggest that tsunami 
relief and rehabilitation efforts were 
military-led and that they bypassed 
affected indigenous communities 
and local civilian administration.
As many humanitarian actors 
involved in the tsunami relief and 
reconstruction begin to evaluate 
their responses it is to be hoped that 
assessments will offer critical com-
parative perspectives on the varying 
responses undertaken by those 
agencies which operated in two or 
more affected areas, thus facing 
distinct and distinctly political chal-
lenges. The long-standing presence 
of UNHCR and other UN bodies in 
Sri Lanka prior to the tsunami sug-
gests an illuminating contrast with 
Aceh, for example, with far-reaching 
implications on the relief efforts that 
ensued. 
Concerns about shortcomings in 
meeting the rights of disaster-
induced IDPs to protection have 
drawn attention to relations of 
power and politics within which 
IDPs remain embedded. Authors in 
this special issue of FMR highlight a 
range of protection concerns in the 
aftermath of the tsunami, including 
access to assistance, enforced reloca-
tion, sexual and gender-based vio-
lence, safe and voluntary return, loss 
of documentation and restitution 
of property. Such concerns must be 
tackled at an early stage as the pro-
tection of economic, social and cul-
tural rights tends to deteriorate over 
time. As the media focuses on other 
news, large tsunami-affected popula-
tions remain in areas of enduring 
conflict. It is high time to focus more 
systematic and comparative analysis 
on discourses and dynamics of state 
security and everyday politics, how 
they have influenced this complex 
humanitarian emergency and their 
implications for IDP protection and 
assistance.
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Wreckage of 
beachfront homes 
in Banda Aceh, 
Indonesia.
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